Ruin Or Renewal: the United Packinghouse Workers of America and the 1948 Meatpacking Strike in Iowa by Fehn, Bruce
The Annals of Iowa 
Volume 56 Number 4 (Fall 1997) pps. 349-378 
Ruin Or Renewal: the United Packinghouse Workers of America 
and the 1948 Meatpacking Strike in Iowa 
Bruce Fehn 
ISSN 0003-4827 
Copyright © 1997 State Historical Society of Iowa. This article is posted here for personal use, 
not for redistribution. 
Recommended Citation 
Fehn, Bruce. "Ruin Or Renewal: the United Packinghouse Workers of America and the 
1948 Meatpacking Strike in Iowa." The Annals of Iowa 56 (1997), 349-378. 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.17077/0003-4827.10104 
Hosted by Iowa Research Online 
Ruin or Renewal:
The United Packinghouse
Workers of America and the
1948 Meatpacking Strike in Iowa
BRUCE FEHN
AT 12:01 A.M. on March 16,1948, twenty thousand Iowa mem-
bers of the United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA)
walked off their jobs in fifteen plants throughout the state. In
doing so, they joined more than eighty thousand other UPWA
members nationwide in what became one of the most violent
episodes in Iowa's labor history.^ Strikers and strikebreakers
confronted one another in packing towns throughout Iowa. In
Cedar Rapids, Mason City, Ottumwa, Sioux City, and Waterloo,
the strike halted production by major employers, affecting even
I want to thank Merle Davis, Marc Linder, Roger Horowitz, Marvin Bergman,
Wilson Warren, two anonymous reviewers, and, especially, John Schacht for
helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Jeff Buscher for research
assistance. Research for this paper was supported by a 1995-96 Iowa Sesqui-
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1. For analyses of the strike's national development, see Roger Horowitz,
"Negro and White, Unite and Fight!" A Social History of Industrial Unionism in
Meatpacking, 2930-90 (Urbana and Chicago, 1997), 184-89; and David Brody,
The Butcher Workmen: A Study of Unionization (Cambridge, MA, 1964), 232-37.
In Iowa, the UPWA struck the following plants: Armour (Sioux City), Bookey
(Des Moines), Cudahy (Sioux City), Davis Packing (Estherville), Decker, an
Armour subsidiary (Mason City), Des Moines Packing (Des Moines), Glaser
Packing (Fort Dodge and Sioux City), John Morrell and Co. (Ottumwa), Rath
Packing (Waterloo), Swift and Co. (Perry and Sioux City), Tobin Packing (Fort
Dodge and Estherville), and Wilson (Cedar Rapids). Mary Beth Eldridge, Tlie
Rath Packing Company Strike of 1948 (n.p., 1990), 3.
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people not directly involved. The strike held the attention of lo-
cal citizens and was front page news in packing-town newspa-
pers. In the most tragic instance of violent altercation on UPWA
picket lines, a strikebreaker in Waterloo pulled a pistol and shot
UPWA Local 46 member Charles "Chuck" Farrell through the
head, killing him instantly. In response. Local 46 strikers went
on a rampage, prompting Govemor Robert Blue to send Na-
tional Guard troops to Waterloo to maintain order.
This large-scale confrontation between labor and capital
evolved in similar ways in Iowa's various packing centers. The
strike began relatively peacefully, with local union members
even helping companies keep refrigeration and mecharücal units
in operating condition. Within three weeks, however, Wilson
in Cedar Rapids, John Morrell in Ottumwa, and other meat-
packing firms established a much harder line with the strikers.
Company officials published deadlines in local newspapers after
which new workers would be hired to replace striking workers.
When strikebreakers did cross pickets lines, often with local
police protection, unionists reacted by harassing them as well
as the companies' supervisory personnel.
From late March to mid-April, companies sought and ob-
tained court injunctions to force UPWA members to quit their
more aggressive tactics against strikebreakers. Rather than ca-
pitulating to these legal maneuvers, the strikers adjusted their
tactics. Instead of relying so much on mass picketing, they con-
fi-onted and intimidated would-be strikebreakers at places away
from the picket line. These incidents heightened antagonisms
between strikers, company officials, police, and strikebreakers.
As UPWA members grew angrier, it became more difficult for
union leaders to control them. This created the potential for
larger-scale, more violent confrontations. In Waterloo, Chuck -
Farrell's killing ignited that potential.
The 1948 strike had a mixed legacy for the long-term vital-
ity of the United Packinghouse Workers. For many members,
though, union activities, undertaken in the face of corporate
power, reinforced their allegiance to the UPWA and to one an-
other. In numerous incidents, no one of which may have been
definitive in itself, UPWA members displayed their solidarity—
on the picket line, in confrontations with strikebreakers and po-
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lice, and through acts of personal generosity as strikers helped
each other weather seventy-five grueling days without a pay-
check. These episodes reinforced many UPWA members' union
allegiance, which they had developed as the great industrial
union movement swept through the meatpacking industry.
Their commitment to oppositional strength equipped Iowa's
packinghouse workers to win back a significant measure of the
power most UPWA local uniorxs lost after the 1948 meatpacking
strike.
UPWA LOCAL UNIONS' oppositional strength, and the seeds
of urûon resurgence following the 1948 strike, were contained
in the local union structure that UPWA pioneers had built to
transform working conditions in Iowa's meatpacking industry.
During the late 1930s and 40s, UPWA activists built powerful
shop-floor organizations, which they then used to pressure
company supervisors to resolve grievances. Frequent displays
of strength and mutual support through work slowdowns or
walkouts demonstrated local unions' power and helped create
a strong sense of solidarity among UPWA members inside pack-
inghouses.^
Local union members' sense of solidarity was laced with
an oppositional outlook. They viewed management as a force
responding almost exclusively to collective pressure adminis-
tered at the point of production. In other words, UPWA mem-
bers came to understand that packing companies responded to
workers' interests only if workers threatened the owners' profit
margin through collective activity. Eventually, this sense of op-
positional strength spread beyond the packing plants and UPWA
2. On the power of UPWA locals' shop-ñoor organizations, see Horowitz,
Negro and White Unite and Fight, chaps. 2-5 passim; Paul Street, "Breaking Up
Old Hatreds and Breaking Through the Fear: The Rise of the Packinghouse
Workers Organizing Committee in Chicago, 1933-1940," Studies in History
and Politics 5 (1986), 69-71; and Rick Halpem, "Race and Radicalism in the
Chicago Stockyards: The Rise of the Chicago Packinghouse Workers Organizing
Committee," in Unionizing the Jungles: Labor and Community in the Twentieth-
Century Meatpacking Industry, ed. Shelton Stromquist and Marvin Bergman
(Iowa City, 1997), 83-85. On the "hardline stance" of Local 1 union founders
in Ottumwa, see Wilson J. Warren, "The Heyday of the CIO in Iowa: Ottumwa's
Meatpacking Workers, 1937-1954," Annals of ¡owa 51 (1992), 368-72.
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union halls.^ To a significant degree, it permeated UPWA fami-
lies and their commurüties. Consequently, in major strikes, such
as the one in 1948, UPWA locals gained support for the uruon
cause from many townspeople and fanners and some local busi-
nesspeople.
To comprehend the sources of union solidarity and opposi-
tional outlook among UPWA members, one must first under-
stand how union activists went about undermining what was
often described as an outrageous system of exploitative labor
within the packinghouses of Iowa. "Slave labor is what it was,"
recalled Louis Tickal, who began working at Sinclair Packing
(later Wilson and Company) in Cedar Rapids in 1929. The com-
pany sometimes required employees to work sixteen-hour days
without overtime compensation. Tickal later told interviewers,
"without a union, we'd never have survived down there. They
[the company] wouldn't kick you out, they'd kill you" with
increased labor demands that broke workers physically and
emotionally.*
In oral history testimony, many workers recalled abuses
and indignities perpetrated by supervisory personnel. Before the
UPWA organized Iowa plants, workers had little job security.
Company foremen typically exercised firm control over hiring,
firing, and job placement, and they often made employment
decisions based on favoritism. That set the stage for discrimina-
tory employment practices based on race, age, and sex. Viola
Jones, a Waterloo Rath worker, remembered that some foremen
at Rath "were like bears." She watched while a foreman fired
an older woman who could not keep up the demanding pace
3. Jeremy Brecher, Strike! (Boston, 1972), 291-93; Warren, "Heyday of the CIO,"
372-73.1 purposefully avoid using the terms oppositional consciousness and oppo-
sitional culture, which have been brilliantly employed by George Lipsitz, A Life
in the Struggle: Ivory Perry and the Culture of Opposition (Philadelphia, 1988);
and Robin D. G. Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists during the Great
Depression (Chapel Hill, NC, 1990), chap. 5. Rather, I use the terms oppositional
outlook and solidarity, which more accurately capture UPWA workers' under-
standing that through collective action, and the threat thereof, they were able
to influence packinghouse management's behavior and decision making.
4. Louis Tickal, interview. Cedar Rapids, 17 April 1986, United Packinghouse
Workers of America Oral History Project (hereafter UPWAOHP), State His-
torical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
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of work. "She stood there and cried." Local 46 union founder
Velma Otterman Schrader, who also worked at Waterloo Rath,
recalled how a foreman replaced an older worker with a younger
woman to whom the foreman "took a fancy." As he walked
through Schrader's department to decide where to place the
younger woman, "the older women just put their heads down
and twisted wieners to beat the band."^
Foremen exercised rigorous and arbitrary control over the
shop floor. Alvin Edwards recalled how he once "took sick"
while at work at the Swift plant in Sioux City. The foreman
told him that he would either continue work or be fired. At
Wilson and Company in Cedar Rapids, one foreman would not
allow women to chew gum. He also appointed a woman to time
her fellow workers' restroom visits. "If [that woman] didn't like
you, she didn't let you go until she was damn good and ready."
As a result of such restrictions on workers' movements, a woman
w i^th bladder trouble wet her pants. Another worker miscarried
after she was not allowed to leave work. Oral history testimony
indicates such examples of humiliation and harassment at Rath
echoed throughout Iowa prior to the successful unionization of
the meatpacking industry.^
From its inception in 1937, the UPWA (at first called the
Packinghouse Workers Organizing Comnüttee, or PWOC) be-
gan to win workers' allegiance by demonstrating its power to
prevent company abuses. In the 1930s and 40s, union activists
from Cedar Rapids, Austin (Minnesota), and Chicago organized
workers in Waterloo's Rath Packing Company, Ottumwa's John
Morrell and Company, Mason City's Jacob Decker, and Sioux
5. Viola Jones, interview, Waterloo, 6 May 1986, and Velma Otterman Schrader,
interview, Waterloo, 7 May 1986, UPWAOHP; Gregory Zieren, "'If You're
Union, You Stick Together': Cedar Rapids Packinghouse Workers in the CiO,"
Palimpsest 76 (1995), 36-37,40-42. On the foreman's power at this time in the
John Morrell plant in Ottumwa, see Wilson J. Warren, "The Welfare Capitalism
of John Morrell and Company, 1922-1937," Annals of Iowa 47 (1984), 509-10.
6. Alvin Edwards, interview, Sioux City, 1 July 1986; Helen Zrudsky, inter-
view. Cedar Rapids, 18 April 1986; Viola Jones, interview, UPWAOHP. On
incidents of sexual harassment, see Velma Otterman Schrader, interview,
UPWAOHP; Velma Otterman, interview, Waterloo, 30 June 1981; and Mary
Ashlock, interview, Mason City, 17 November, 1981, Iowa Labor History Oral
Project (hereafer ILHOP), State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City.
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City's Armour, Swift, and Cudahy packing plants. Union organi-
zation and recognition brought benefits to workers, including
higher wages, grievance procedures, improved working condi-
tions, and, above all, a strictly enforced seniority system.^
Local unions won these benefits by installing and activating
powerful steward systems inside Iowa's UPWA-organized pack-
inghouses. These steward systems became so tightly organized
and controlled by union members that a dispute in one part of
a packinghouse could quickly lead to a shutdown of the plant's
entire operation. The threat of meat spoilage put tremendous
pressure on company officials to settle grievances quickly. With
a seniority system securely in place, the power of foremen and
other supervisory personnel was sigruficantly curtailed. If super-
visors threatened workers with discharge, they had to have a
very good reason for doing so. Formal grievance procedures
enabled employees to seek redress if they felt they had been
unfairly discharged or otherwise mistreated. If supervisors were
intransigent, local unions could, and often did, employ their
shop-floor power to interrupt production.*
In the years prior to the 1948 strike, local union members
had grown accustomed to using strikes to organize plants, force
consideration of union demands, and impress fainthearted work-
ers with urüon power. Members came to regard strikes, whether
local or nationwide, as a legitimate and required method of in-
fluencing company behavior. "We were really one for all and
all for one," recalled Fred Nolting of UPWA Local 46 in Water-
loo. "If one of our members got treated unfairly, unjustly, with-
out due process being followed, we just had a confrontation."'
Union activists came to regard strikes, further, as a means
of imbuing workers' consciousness with a sense of solidarity.
7. Horowitz, Negro and White, Unite and Fight, chaps. 2-5 passim; Bruce Fehn,
"'Chickens Come Home to Roost': Industrial Reorganization, Seniority and
Gender Conflict in the United Packinghouse Workers of America, 1956-1966,"
Labor History 34 (1993), 328-30.
8. Horowitz, Negro and White, Unite and Fight, chaps. 2-5 and 9 passim; idem,
"'It Wasn't a Time to Compromise': The Unionization of Sioux City's Packing-
houses, 1937-1942," Annals of Iowa 50 (1989/1990), 241-68; Zieren, "'If You're
Union, You Stick Together,'" 37-38, 40-42.
9. Fred Nolting, interview, Waterloo, 21 June 1981, ILHOP.
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As Anthony "Tony" Fetter of UPWA Local 3 in Cedar Rapids
observed, "In the old days instead of arguing a grievance [union
stewards would] just say, 'Okay, we'll shut 'er down.'" Accord-
ing to Fetter, "wildcat strikes used to be taken for granted. You
could shut the plant down or shut the department down." In
his oral history of Iowa labor, Shelton Stromquist assembled
workers' testimony to show how union leadership in Ottumwa
Local 1 used wildcat strikes regularly "to whack 'em" and let
management know that "you're running the show."^"
THE NATIONWIDE 1948 STRIKE sorely tested the UPWA's
ability to use strikes to raise wages, improve working conditions,
and signal management that the UPWA demanded a hand in
"running the show." Two years earlier, the UPWA had won a
nationwide strike that led to a significant wage hike for its mem-
bers. The union's 1946 walkout, however, took place under cir-
cumstances substantially different than those surrounding the
1948 strike. For one, the 1946 strike was part of the largest strike
wave in United States history, and UPWA members benefited
from the collective action of 4.6 million people who, at various
times that year, stopped work nearly five thousand times. Even
more importantly, the UPWA's archrival, the Amalgamated
Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, also went
on strike in 1946, thereby confronting the great meatpacking
chains of Swift, Armour, Cudahy, Wilson, and John Morrell
with an almost wholly united packinghouse workforce. Neither
condition held in 1948. The UPWA struck out on its own at a
time that some in the UPWA's leadership—including President
Ralph Helstein—did not regard as propitious."
Why, then, did the UPWA leadership in Chicago decide to
call a nationwide strike in 1948? News accounts at the time
10. Shelton Stromquist, Solidarity and Survival: An Oral History of Iowa Labor
in the Twentieth Century (Iowa City, 1993), 160, 207, On the use of wildcat
strikes in Iowa packinghouses, see also interviews with Bruce Nolan, Richard
Lindner, Eugene Weems, and Jack McCoy, quoted ibid., 99-100, 107-8,155,
206-7. On Ottumwa Local l's shop-floor power and use of strikes and job
actions, see Wilson J. Warren, "Heyday of the CIO," 371-72.
11. James R. Green, The World of the Worker: Labor in Twentieth-Century America
(New York, 1980), 194; Ralph Helstein, interview, Chicago, 12 May 1983, ILHOP.
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focused on the dispute over wages as the key issue motivating
union leaders to call for a nationwide strike.'^ Indeed, wages
were a key factor. With the abolition of price controls after the
war, living costs were rising sharply. Workers wanted a raise.
Union leaders pointed out that in 1948 a single breadwinner
needed to eam $1.65 per hour in order to support a family of
four, yet two-thirds of all packinghouse workers eamed less
than $1.10 per hour."
Wages were not, however, the only concern. Some union
leaders were motivated, to a sigrüficant degree, by a desire to
challenge the recently enacted Taft-Hartley Act. Passed in 1947
in the wake of the 1946 strike wave, Taft-Hartley severely re-
stricted union activities. With its requirement of prior notice
for strike action, the act threatened the UPWA's traditional base
of strength: the ability to stop production at a moment's notice
and catch the company by surprise.'"' Frank Ellis, head of the
UPWA's organization department, wamed the union's executive
board that Taft-Hartley "has as one of its main objectives the
purpose of undermining union authority and disintegrating our
union wherever possible." The law, he charged, "opens the door
wide for various forms of company-inspired attacks inside our
local unions." Ellis's viewpoint reflected that of District 3 leader-
ship, headquartered in Des Moines, as well as many of Iowa's
union rank-and-file. Iowa UPWA members voted to strike in
part because they wanted to prevent companies from "disman-
tling] the position of strength the unions had achieved on the
shop-floor."'^
12. See, for example. Business Week, 28 February 1948,91; Chicago Daily Tributie,
16 March 1948; New York Times, 17 March 1948; "Strike Threatens Tie-up of
Meat Supply," folder 8, box 449, United Packinghouse Workers of America
Records, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
13. Ralph Helstein, "The Packinghouse Workers' Case," New Republic, 29
March 1948, 7; The Packinghouse Worker, 9 July 1948, 3.
14. Horowitz, Negro and White, Unite and Fight, 181; Stromquist, Solidarity and
Survival, 176.
15. "Organization Department Proposals Submitted to Intemational ExecuHve
Board," 16 September 1947, UPWA Records. See also Stromquist, Solidarity
and Survival, 176; and Horowitz, Negro and White, Unite and Fight, 183.
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In early March 1948, UPWA members in Iowa and other
states prepared to quit work in order to attain a wage increase
and demonstrate disapproval of Taft-Hartley. By that time, the
efforts of the UPWA's international leadership to come to an
agreement with the Big Four meatpacking companies (Armour,
Cudahy, Swift, and Wilson) were on the verge of collapse.'^
The UPWA leadership had demanded a twenty-nine-cent hourly
wage increase; Big Four negotiators had countered with an offer
of nine cents. When negotiations failed to bridge the wage im-
passe, UPWA members voted overwhelmingly, by a twenty to
one margin, to go out on strike. On March 16, Iowa's twenty
thousand UPWA members joined eighty thousand members in
other states in a walkout that shut 65 plants across the country.'^
DURING THE STRIKE'S FIRST FEW DAYS, union solidarity
was relatively easy to maintain in Iowa's packing towns. Union
rank-and-file followed local strike committees' orders to set up
and maintain picket lines and sheds around packing facilities.
UPWA Local 1 strikers in Ottumwa established a picket line six
and one-half miles long around the entire John Morrell plant.
Picketers required company officials to show passes issued by
the union before they could enter or leave the plant. In Water-
loo, Local 46 picket captains outside Rath distributed signs an-
nouncing to passersby, "Packing House Workers Are #1!"; "We
March Against Hunger Cuts"; "No Raise! No Work!"; "Watch
Us Grow." A Local 89 sign placed outside the Swift plant in
Des Moines' southeast "bottoms" area read "Closed for Altera-
tion of Swift's Thinking!" Cedar Rapids Local 3 members sta-
tioned picket sheds around the Wilson and Company plant,
and strike leaders assigned members around-the-clock shifts for
walking the line. Picket captains roamed the plant's perimeter
to ensure that sixteen pickets walked at each of the company's
16. In a system known as "pattern bargaining," contract agreements with the
Big Four established the pattern for wages and work rules subsequently nego-
tiated at independent packers such as Rath Packing Company in Waterloo.
17. Leslie F. Orear and Stephen H. Diamond, Out of the jungle: The Packinghouse
Workers' Fight for justice and Equality (Chicago, 1968).
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Edward Filliman, chief steward of UPWA Local 1 in Ottumwa,
staffs a picket line along with a colleague. All of the photographs
accompanying this article are from a Pictorial History of the 1948
UPWA Strike, an Jowa Humanities Board display in the UPWA
Local 46 Papers, State Historical Society of Jowa, Iowa City.
thirteen gate entrances.'®
Meanwhile, strikers sought community support for the union
struggle. Mickey Lockhart and other Local 3 members in Cedar
Rapids "went out begging . . . for day old goods" and went to
neighborhood grocery stores to convince them not to buy Wil-
18. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Depart-
ments, Investigation as to the Administration of the Laws Affecting Labor Disputes,
Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the Anti-Racketeering Statute, the Interstate
Transportation of Pickets, and the Activities of the Department of Justice, in Con-
nection vAth Strikes in tlie Meat-Packing Industry in Twenty States. Hearings before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments,
80th Cong-, 2d sess., 20 May 1948,166; idem. Twenty-first Intermediate Report,
Report 2464, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 20 December 1948, 10; The Packinghouse
Worker, 2 April 1948, 7; Warren, "Heyday of the CIO," 376; Mary Eldridge,
rough draft of manuscript for her history of The Rath Packing Company Strike
of 1948, part 1, p. 26, folder 29, box 2, Local 46 Papers, State Historical Society
of Iowa (SHSI), Iowa City. See also Sister John Marie Daly, "History of Union-
ization, Waterloo, Iowa," p. 44, folder 17, box 1, ibid.
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son products. "We done such a good job in local stores," Lock-
hart recalled, "that Wilson had a hard time getting some of their
orders back" after the strike ended. Strikers in Cedar Rapids ac-
cepted the Kacere family's offer to set up a strike kitchen in
their cafe, to which local merchants contributed provisions.
While the strike kitchen supplied food and coffee, picketers
sang songs to keep np their spirits as they spent monotonous
hours on picket duty."
In the first week or two of the strike, UPWA members main-
tained relatively positive working relationships with local mu-
nicipal officials, police, and even packinghouse management.
Police in Sioux City presented a check for two hundred dollars
to the UPWA's strike fund. In Waterloo, Local 46 and Rath
Packing Company officials entered a "gentlemen's agreement"
to maintain plant equipment and ensure that meat did not spoil.
When there were trucks or trains to be unloaded. Rath asked
the union to send workers to the plant, and the union cooper-
ated with the company's requests. To facilitate these efforts.
Local 46 issued passes to supervisory personnel, union power-
house workers, and union watchmen who entered the plant to
maintain refrigeration equipment and do safety inspections. In
an attempt to promote good will with the community and law
enforcement officials. Local 46 invited Waterloo's mayor. Bailey
Bames, and the Black Hawk County sheriff to speak at the
union's mass rally on the eve of the strike. Local 46 pledged to
city officials that it would monitor the conduct of members on
the picket line, and the sheriff deputized union members who
pledged to prevent violence and maintain order.^ "
However, peaceful relationships between management and
members of Iowa's UPWA local unions quickly unravelled as
negotiations between the UPWA and the Big Four went no-
where. Before the UPWA strike began, meatpackers reached
agreement for a nine-cent per hour wage increase with the
UPWA's two chief rivals in the industry: the National Brother-
19. The Packinghouse Worker, 7; Zieren, "'If You're Union, You Stick Together,'"
42-44.
20. Daly, "History of Unionization," 44; Eldridge, draft of history, part 1, pp.
15-16 and 26, and part 2, p. 11; idem. Rath Packing Company Strike, 6.
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hood of Packinghouse Workers (NBPW) and, more significantly,
the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North
America (AMCBW). These agreements with the AMCBW and
NBPW stiffened company resolve to hold firm, not surprisingly,
since those two unions represented workers in thirty-four Big
Four units. Those plants were not affected by the UPWA walk-
out and, in historian David Brody's phrase, "ran full blast."^'
The companies' stiffened resolve was revealed further in
the course of government mediation efforts. At those mediation
meetings, company representatives were intransigent, refusing
to make a single concession beyond what they had offered in
negotiations prior to the strike's commencement. On April 8 a
board of inquiry, appointed by President Truman to study the
strike's effect on national health and safety, further reduced
prospects for a quick settlement. It reported that the nine-cent
per hour wage increase the packers had originally offered and
successfully negotiated with the AMCBW and the NBPW was
"adequate compensation for changes in the cost of living since
the last wage increase of six cents per hour in June 1947." This
indicated that the president would not step in to end the strike
and impose an arbitrated settlements^
SUCH DEVELOPMENTS on the national scene coincided
with a rapid deterioration of the amity that had prevailed at
Iow a^ strike sites during the first three to five weeks of the strike.
Throughout the state, companies began to challenge unions with
a series of moves that had the potential to weaken strikers' re-
solve. First, companies tried to resume operations by attempting
to move livestock in or meat products out of packing facilities."
Then, company officials threatened to hire replacement workers
unless the strike came to a swift conclusion. By mid-April, the
latter was more than a threat; strikebreakers were crossing
21. Brady, The Butcher Workmen, 233.
22. Business Week, 17 AprU 1948,106-7; Brody, The Butcher Workmen, 233-34;
Eldridge, Rath Packing Company Strike, 8.
23. Cedar Rapids Gazette, 24 and 25 March and 3 April 1948; Sioux City Joumal,
20 March 1948; Mason City Globe-Gazette, 14,15, and 16 April 1948; Ottumwa
Courier, 8 April 1948.
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picket lines, sometimes under the protection of local police.
Management also sent letters to workers and had supervisory
personnel approach union members, both in an attempt to en-
tice them back to work.^ *
To bolster solidarity and display continuing union strength,
UPWA members countered with mass picketing, attacks on com-
pany property, and intimidation of would-be strikebreakers. In
Ottumwa, strikers had picketed the John Morrell and Company
plant peacefully for three weeks. On April 6, however, when
management informed Local 1 that it would begin to move
meat out of the plant, officers and members resorted to more
physically aggressive tactics. Immediately, Edward Filliman,
Local l's chief steward, announced in the pages of the Ottum-
wa Courier that "any attempt to move meat out will result in
trouble— plenty of it — and there would be no trouble . . . if
the company didn't try to move meat." The next day UPWA
pickets illegally occupied company property as they stood on
railroad tracks to prevent trains from shipping meat. On April
8, union members piled logs, sandbags and other debris under-
neath railroad cars, painted "SCAB MEAT" on the sides of the
cars, and allegedly set a fire beneath them. "They did this,"
according to testimony at a U.S. House Subcommittee hearing
on the strike, "in the presence of about 16 local police officers
who were within 100 yards of the scene but who made no at-
tempt to restrain the activity. "^ ^
To overcome unionists' ability to keep strikebreakers out
of the plants and prevent materials from moving in and out,
meatpacking firms sought and obtained court injunctions de-
signed to reduce the unions' strength on picket lines. In late
March a state district court issued an injunction to prohibit
mass picketing by Local 38 union members in Mason City,
who had been able to prevent trucks and trains from entering
or leaving the Decker plant. On April 9 another district court
24. Cedar Rapids Gazette, 12 April 1948; Waterloo Courier, 18,19, and 21 April 1948;
Mason City Clobe-Cazette, 15 and 16 April 1948.
25. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in Executive Depart-
ments, Twenty-first Intermediate Report, 10; U.S. Congress, House, Investigation
as to the Administration of the ¡MWS Affecting Labor Disputes, 166-75; Ottumwa
Courier, 8 April 1948.
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issued a restraining injunction, restricting Ottumwa Local 1 to
five pickets at each gate at John Morrell and Company The
injunction also instructed pickets not to use barricades and to
use only "peaceful persuasion" in their interaction with persons
trying to enter the plant. In a similar move, a district court judge
in Waterloo issued an injunction on April 17 ordering Local 46
strikers not to interfere with individuals entering or departing
the Rath plant. As in Mason City and Ottumwa, the injunction
ordered them not to inhibit the movement of trucks or trains
and restricted the number of pickets Local 46 could deploy at
the company's gates.^ ^
In the face of injunctions to reduce their picket lines' effec-
tiveness, union members turned increasingly to acts of intimida-
tion to discourage strikebreakers and frighten supervisory per-
sonnel. Aggressive acts directed at strikebreakers in Ottumwa
were so frequent that on April 22 the Ottumwa Courier reported
that "lawless goon squads are patrolling the city streets and
neighboring highways, to terrorize persons connected with John
Morrell & Co." Local urüon members also tried to intimidate
those who did business with John Morrell. On April 16, for ex-
ample, they picketed the owner of an Ottumwa service station
who had entered the plant to repair company vehicles. In Ma-
son City, after courts issued injunctions and restraining orders,
Juanita Barragan and Isabel Gomez were arrested and later fined
for attacking a woman who tried to cross the picket line at the
Decker ^^
26. The Packinghouse Worker, 9 July 1948; Wilson, "Heyday of the CIO," 377;
Mason City Globe-Gazette, 29 March 1948; Ottumwa Courier, 9 and 23 April 1948;
Waterloo Courier, 18,19, and 21 April 1948; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 28 March and
18 and 19 April 1948; Sioux City Joumal, 1 and 2 May 1948.
27. Ottumwa Courier, 22 April 1948; Warren, "Heyday of the CIO," 377-78;
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments,
Investigation as to the Administration of the Laws Affecting Labor Disputes, 167;
Mason City Globe-Gazette, 15,16, and 28 April 1948. There was a clear pattern
during the 1948 strike of Iowa's UPWA women intimidating women strike-
breakers. On women's contributions to the 1948 strike and its impact on the
union's women's rights movements, see Bruce R. Pehn, "Striking Women:
Gender, Race, and Class in the United Packinghouse Workers of America,
1938-1968" (Ph.D. diss.. University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1991), 2n-12ff.
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As company officials reopened plants and courts issued
injunctions, the need for worker solidarity became increasingly
obvious to the workers themselves. Police activities implemented
to break the strike also heightened union members' oppositional
outlook. In Waterloo, Local 46 president Leo Guyrm told his
union brethren that Waterloo's city officials had breached their
"good faith" agreement with the union that the latter would be
responsible for policing the behavior of its members and main-
taining order on the picket line. City officials who had earlier
deputized union members to police the behavior of their fellow
union rank-and-file were now accused by Guynn of "aiding
and abetting strike breaking." In a remark that bespoke imion
members' perception of collaboration between the govemment
and the company, Guyrm claimed that Local 46 members did
not "believe the taxpayers will sanction the use of their police
force as a strike breaking agency for private industrial interests."
To protest the use of police to aid the company and assist strike-
breakers. Local 46 members retumed the deputy badges that
had represented their commitment to maintain order on the
picket line.^
Company efforts to break the strike, along with the collab-
oration of city and state officials, required urüon leaders to con-
stantly bolster worker resolve. To maintain solidarity and keep
up members' spirits, union officers and activists talked tough
and told members to close ranks and stand firm. UPWA offi-
cials from Chicago appeared in Iowa packing towns to help
maintain strikers' morale. In late March field representative
Russell Lasley, a founding member of Waterloo Local 46, told
Local 34 strikers in Mason City, "we're going to have to do
something about these city police who sit around the main gate.
I guess they're there to scare us. But they'll find out we don't
scare." At a union meeting in Waterloo on April 18, the day
after the Rath plant reopened, A. T. Stephens, the UPWA's Dis-
trict 3 director, told Local 46 members in Waterloo, "I've never
seen this piece of paper [the court injunction] butcher any cattle
and I've never seen it operate a sliced bacon machine."^^
28. Waterloo Courier, 18 April 1948; Eldridge, draft of history, part 1, pp. 26, 28.
29. Mason City Globe-Gazette. 27 March 1948; Waterloo Courier, 19 April 1948.
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With this kind of encouragement, union members became
increasingly hostile in words and actions directed at police and
strikebreakers. Strikers by now regarded police as collaborators
in company efforts to defeat the strike. In Waterloo, Local 46
members used a loudspeaker to shower strikebreakers and po-
lice officers with strings of epithets. In a reference to Waterloo's
Mayor Bames and the police force, one picket at the loudspeaker
announced, "here comes Bailey Bames Boy Scouts. It won't be
long now until those stinkin rats [i.e., the strikebreakers] will
be crawling out of their holes. . . . There comes a couple of
them out the door now." Strikers also used the loudspeaker to
let strikebreakers know that they would suffer for their actions.
A union member warned them that "a Scab is branded. He's
branded deep. He's branded for many years to come. You don't
forget that you had a knife stuck in your back... . You remem-
ber it for years." On April 19, Black Hawk County obtained an
injunction prohibiting Local 46 from using loudspeakers.^"
THE INJUNCTIONS, confrontations with police and strike-
breakers, long hours on picket duty, and the pinch of weeks
without a paycheck exacted a tremendous toll on UPWA mem-
bers and strained union solidarity. In Iowa's packing towns the
strike became a family affair as the homes, cars, and household
goods that family members had labored to attain became threat-
ened w i^th repossession. Local union welfare committees sup-
plied desperate workers with small loans and food vouchers.
However, according to one striker, "there just wasn't that much
money there." As rent and utility bills went unpaid, strikers'
families found themselves without basic utilities or threatened
with eviction from their homes. "I thought we were going to
starve to death," Local 46 member Viola Jones recalled.^'
For some union members, the economic strain overwhelmed
union commitments and perhaps even their sense of self-respect.
30. Pictorial History of the 1948 UPWA Strike, panel 3, Iowa HumaniHes Board
display. Gene Redmon, project director (hereafter cited as IHB display), UPWA
Local 46 Papers; Eldridge, draft of history, part 1, p. 33.
31. James Hamiyn, interview, Waterloo, 25 June 1981, ILHOP; Cedar Rapids
Gazette, 23 April 1948; Viola Jones, interview, UPWAOHP.
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They went back to work. "When people are desperate for work,"
Cedar Rapids Wilson Local 3 veteran Frank Hlavacek observed,
"they'll go in there. It don't make no difference, your best friend
will go in there." Even veteran, committed union members, such
as Everett Dietz, seriously considered returning to work to sup-
port their families. At the last moment, Everett's brother, a found-
ing member of Waterloo Rath Local 46, loaned him money. Thus
aided, he was able to resist the temptation to cross the greatly
reinforced picket line that Local 46 members had by then estab-
lished around the Rath plant.^ ^
Union members and supporters displayed solidarity with
acts of personal generosity, relying on one another for help
along with assistance from community agencies and nonunion
members of their local communities. In packing towns through-
out the state, union members solicited food donations from
merchants and citizens and asked them to boycott meat com-
pany products. Some of Sioux City's wholesale distributors re-
sponded with donations of vegetables and ground meat. Also
in Sioux City, union members visited local taverns, distributed
leaflets explaining the union position, and asked patror\s to do-
nate to the Sioux City union's strike funds. In the South Bottoms
neighborhood in Sioux City, where many packinghouse workers
resided, trade unionists implemented an effective "don't buy"
campaign against Swift, Armour, and Cudahy. Comer grocery
stores, which checkered the South Bottoms area, liberally ex-
tended credit to strikers. One Sioux City physician, in response
to union appeals, offered strikers his services free of charge.^ ^
Union activists also organized shows and moments of the-
ater both to lift strikers' spirits and to win conununity support
In Waterloo, a brass band consisting of Local 46 members enter-
tained at union meetings and on the picket lines. According to
one student of the strike in Waterloo, "people from all over
town came to see what would happen next and be entertained."
32. Frank Hlavacek, interview. Cedar Rapids, 17 April 1986, UPWAOHP;
Everett Dietz, interview, Waterloo, 6 May 1986, UPWAOHP. On mass picket-
ing in Waterloo, see Waterloo Courier, 18,19, and 21 April 1948.
33. Stromquist, Solidarity and Survival, 185; The Packinghouse Worker, 2 and 16
April 1948.
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I II
Employees inside the Rath Packing plant observe and photograph
strike activities outside the plant.
On May 6, three days after Rath announced an official end to
the prevailing contract, union members staged a mock funeral
and burial of the contract. A worker's black panel truck was
decorated as a hearse. Draped in black and carrying a pl5^wood
coffin with the contract's "remains," it was driven several blocks
to the steps of the union hall. Men wore suits and women car-
ried "armfuls of rhubarb leaves for flowers." At the union hall
the contract "lay in state" as mourners passed by and derisively
wailed at their loss. One worker read a long-winded "eulogy"
that detailed the contract's features. The reading delighted on-
lookers. Some observers, however, were not so amused. From
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windows high in the Rath Packing Company office building
across from the union hall. Rath officials filmed and photo-
graphed the proceedings.^
At the end of April, as the strike entered its sixth week, it
became clear that the companies, rather than negotiating, were
intent on breaking union solidarity and imposing a settlement
on the UPWA. Companies increased the pressure by running
advertisements in local newspapers, encouraging striking work-
ers to return to work. On April 29 and 30, for example, Wilson
ran large advertisements in the Cedar Rapids Gazette, inviting all
workers to return to the plant and threatening the loss of their
jobs if they did not. The offer included the original rune-cent
wage hike offer, with the same rights that prevailed before the
strike. Wilson claimed that the decision to reopen was driven by
losses to farmers, employees, and the company, and that com-
pany officials refused arbitration because management could
never allow a third party to dictate company costs. Wilson de-
clared that it had "no intention" of budging on a maximum wage
hike of nine cents per hour. To entice workers into the Decker
plant in Mason City, the company placed advertisements prom-
ising ten-hour workdays, seven days per week, with doubletime
and overtime. While the companies enticed replacement workers
and declared their refusal to reopen negotiations, they also took
more drastic measures to import strikebreakers. In Waterloo and
Cedar Rapids, for example, both Rath and Wilson hired private
buses to transport strikebreakers into the plant/"*^
By early May, as the strike entered its eighth week, UPWA
members in Iowa adopted more drastic measures of their own
to counter company maneuvers to bring strikebreakers across
picket lines. From packing towns throughout Iowa came reports
of union members punishing workers who crossed lines, thereby
serving notice to others that they would pay a price if they tried
34. Eldridge, draft of history, part 1, pp. 47, 53; IHB display, panel 7.
35. Cedar Rapids Gazette, 29 and 30 April 1948; The Packinghouse Worker, 30
April 1948; Velma Wetzel, interview. Cedar Rapids, 12 October 1979, ILHOP.
In Waterloo, the Rath Company resorted to private buses because when city
buses arrived as usual at plant gates, UPWA members boarded them and
occupied theseatsduring the buses'entire routes. Of course, this discouraged
replacement workers from getting on the buses. Waterloo Courier, 22 April 1948.
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to cross.^ * On May 4, for example, the Cedar Rapids Gazette ran
a photo of a woman striker from Local 3 confronting another
woman intent on crossing the picket line. The next day the Ga-
zette reported that a woman had been "cautioned" for beating
on the car of a female strikebreaker who had taunted union
picketers. On May 11 George Scurlock, Local 3's chief steward,
tried to rally strikers by using his car to block the path of a bus
Wilson and Company used to carry strikebreakers into the plant.
Incidents of violence and intimidation also occurred away from
the picket line. When a station wagon full of strikebreakers
from the nearby town of Vinton tried to go to the Wilson plant
in Cedar Rapids, it was met near the Cedar Rapids city limits
by a carload of Local 3 members. The strikers stopped the sta-
tion wagon and tried to convince the potential strikebreakers
not to go to the plant. When the latter said they were going to
go on to the plant, the strikers slashed their tires.^''
By mid-May confrontations between strikers, supervisors,
and strikebreakers had grown in frequency and intensity. UPWA
local union officials and Iowa District 3 officers found it more
and more difficult to control unionists' behavior. This was trag-
ically manifested in Waterloo just two days before the UPWA's
National Strategy Committee recommended ending the strike.
At 5:30 p.m. on May 19, 1948, striking members of Local 46
surrounded Fred Lee Roberts's car as he tried to enter the Rath
Packing Company as a replacement worker. As unionists began
to rock Roberts's car back-and-forth, he waved a pistol and then
shot union member Chuck Farrell through the head, killing him
instantly. The same shot wounded Margaret Grayheim. The
shooting igrüted a riot.^ *
Strikers and their supporters directed their anger at Rath
Packing Company and the replacement workers who had been
hired to break the strike. They stormed the plant gates, fought
36. Sioux City journal, 3 May 1948; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 5 May 1948; U.S. Con-
gress, House, Investigation as to the Administration of the Laws Affecting Labor
Disputes, 168-69.
37. Cedar Rapids Gazette, 4,5, and 12 May 1948; Zieren, '"If You're Union, You
Stick Together,'" 44-45.
38. The Waterloo Courier provided extensive coverage of the shooting and its
aftermath in its issues of 20-23 May 1948.
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Striking workers throng the streets of Waterloo in the wake of
Chuck Farrell's shooting.
with strikebreakers, vandalized property, and overtumed dozens
of cars in Rath's parking lot. Although the violence subsided
two hours later, a crowd of several thousand remained in the
area well past midnight. The facts that Roberts was an African
American and the murder victim white exacerbated fears of
further violence. Although the shooting outraged union mem-
bers, it did not cause a racial break within the union. Accord-
ing to Local 46 member Charles Pearson, himself an African
American, strikers did not see the shooting in racial terms.
Rather, Local 46's much heralded interracial unionism, forged
during the previous decade, prevailed over this potentially di-
visive tragedy. Solidarity among black and white unionists per-
sisted as Govemor Robert Blue, in response to calls for help
from municipal officials, ordered nearly one thousand National
Guard troops to Waterloo to prevent further confrontations
between strikers and strikebreakers."*'
39. Chicago Tribune, 21 May 1948; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 20 May 1948; IHB dis-
play, panels 10, 11, and 12; Waterloo Courier, 20 May 1948; Stromquist, Soli-
darity and Survival, 179-82; Charles Pearson, interview, Waterloo, 17 July 1986,
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Hundreds of union members and officials
procession for Chuck Farrell.
in the funeral
With violence escalating in Iowa and other states, UPWA
leaders decided to halt the strike on May 21. In South St. Paul,
Minnesota, strikers used fists and clubs to prevent police from
enforcing a court injunction against mass picketing. Across the
Mississippi River at Newport, Minnesota, strikers overpowered
Cudahy company guards, stormed the plant's gates, released
livestock, and destroyed property.*" As governors in Iowa and
Miruiesota called out the National Guard, UPWA leaders rec-
ognized that union locals were showing signs of exhaustion in
several key locales. Subsequently, UPWA officials recommended
UPWAOHP. For a discussion of interracial unionism in Local 46, see also note
52, below.
40. Newsweek, 24 May 1948, 26; Time, 24 May 1948,26; Ufe, 24 May 1948,29, 31.
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National Guardsmen stand watch outside
the offices of UPWA Local 46 in Waterloo
in the wake of the violence sparked hy
Chuck Farrell's shooting.
that the membership settle with Swift, Armour, and Cudahy for
the original nine-cent per hour wage hike the companies had
offered before the strike began. However, union leaders left lo-
cal unions representing Rath and John Morrell workers free to
continue the strike if they chose to do so. In the case of Wilson
and Company (one of the Big Four companies), UPWA leaders
ordered the strike to continue because the company "insisted
on the right to indiscriminately discharge union members with-
out due recourse to the grievance procedure as the contract re-
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quires." Local 3 members in Cedar Rapids followed their leader-
ship's orders to continue the fight against Wilson.*^
Given the option to remain on strike. Rath Local 46 in Wa-
terloo and John Morrell Local 1 in Ottumwa refused to settle
and remained on the picket lines. Local 46 members seemed
to feel that the sacrifices they had already made had been too
great to permit quitting. Stung by Farrell's death and the occu-
pation by the Iowa National Guard, the membership voted to
continue the strike against Rath Packing Company. In a mes-
sage to Waterloo citizens the day after Farrell's shooting. Lo-
cal 46 members held Rath Company Executive Director A. D.
Donnell responsible for the killing and subsequent riot. The
union claimed that Donnell "had created the incidents of yes-
terday" by obtaining an injunction that forbade the use of the
loudspeakers the union had used to control the activities of
union picketers and supporters. When Donnell inspected the
plant in the riot's aftermath. Local 46 picketers called him a
"murderer," shouted "you're responsible for this," and pointed
to the spot where Farrell had fallen. One week later, however.
Local 46 joined other UPWA locals and accepted the inevitable.
It swallowed Rath's original contract offer of a nine-cent wage
increase.*^
DAMAGE FROM THE 1948 STRIKE was great, and the res-
toration of union power in some of Iowa's local UPWA unions
was in serious doubt. Firebrands in Waterloo and Cedar Rapids
faced companies determined to discipline or discharge them for
strike-related activities. In Cedar Rapids, Wilson and Company
nred George Scurlock, Local 3's chief steward, for his interference
with company efforts to resume operations during the strike.
Scurlock never returned to the Wilson plant. In Waterloo, a
grand jury indicted twenty-three people in connection with
events following Chuck Farrell's shooting—for conspiracy to
incite a riot, malicious mischief, or assault and battery. Two of
41. The Packinghouse Worker, 28 May 1948; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 22 May 1948.
42. The Packinghouse Worker, 28 May 1948.
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Local 46's most active members were convicted and spent time
in prison.*^
To recover from its weakened state and to bolster union
members' confidence, the UPWA tumed to its traditional source
of strength and solidarity, namely, its still powerful steward
organizations. Before too long, shop-floor leaders were employ-
ing strikes and work slowdowns to reassert control inside plants
and win favorable settlement of workers' grievances."*^
Union members also worked to restore union power and
solidarity by relentlessly punishing or ostracizing former strike-
breakers. "Oh sure we put pressure on them," recalled Local 46
member Richard Price. "They'd get into their lunch bucket and
grab a hog turd and put it in between for a sandwich. Oh, they
did atrocious things to them." "As the years went by they never
forgot that they were scabs," recalled Ethel Jerred of Ottumwa
Local 1. "Even right to this day. If that woman should pass away,
I doubt very much whether they would ever say, 'Sweet little
Helen.' They'd probably say, 'Helen the scab,' because that's the
title she's got. That label stays with you till the day you die."^^
In Iowa and other states, the ability of local unions to restore
confidence in the strength and solidarity of shop-floor power en-
abled them to withstand companies' post-strike counterattacks."*^
The UPWA eventually won reinstatement of all but a handful
of discharged workers. In addition, the UPWA withstood chal-
lenges from other unions and, by wide margins, won every one
of twenty-two subsequent recertification elections held in UPWA-
43. Orear and Diamond, Out of the Jungle; Jesse Prosten, interview, Washing-
ton, DC, 18 December 1985, UPWAOHP; Daly, "History of Unionization," 49;
Stromquist, Solidarity and Survival, 180-81; Waterloo Courier, 6 May 1984.
44. Waterloo Courier, 14 November 1948; Stromquist, Solidarity and Survival,
206-8; Roger Horowitz, "The Path Not Taken: A Social History of Industrial
Unionism in Meatpacking, 1930-1960" (Ph.D. diss.. University of Wisconsir\-
Madison, 1990), 584-85.
45. Richard Price, interview, ILHOP; Stromquist, Solidarity and Survival, 186;
Eldridge, Rath Packing Company Strike, 66.
46. Horowitz, Negro and White, Unite and Fight, 192; Viola Jones interview;
George Fletemeyer, interview. South Omaha, NE, 6 June 1986, UPWAOHP.
Fletemeyer, a leader of Swift Local 47 in Omaha, recalled that his union's
steward system "saved the situation" in the wake of the strike. Stromquist,
Solidarity and Survival, 207-8.
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represented plants across the country.*^ Local 46, for example,
withstood a certification challenge by the National Brotherhood
of Packinghouse Workers, winning in 1948 by a margin of four
to one.*^ Furthermore, according to UPWA President Ralph
Helstein, the solidarity and determination displayed by the
rank-and-file in 1948 influenced companies' concessions in con-
tract negotiations the following year. Of the 1949 settlement
with Armour, for example, Helstein recalled, "we had more
gains in that contract tha[n] we had ever negotiated with the
company.... We established . . . [the] five day guarantee, Satur-
day overtime, things our people had been wanting for ages."^'
UPWA locals in Iowa and other states also used the strike's
aftermath as an opportunity to move forward on an agenda to
promote the interests of the urüon's minority members and
women. As part of the campaign to repair the union after the
strike, the UPWA's intemational leadership decided to embark
on a bold new program to improve the status and fortunes of
the union's minority members and women. Intemational Presi-
dent Ralph Helstein and other union leaders were acutely aware
of race as a source of potential division among the rank-and-file.
After a pivotal strike in 1921 and 1922, comparues had effectively
played the race card to divide workers, win the strike, and dam-
age the union movement for years to come. So, to maintain the
loyalty of its African-American members, the UPWA inaugurated
an aggressive antidiscrimination program to eliminate coinpanies'
race-based hiring, placement, and discharge practices.^
47. UPWA records indicate that the Big Pour alone fired 788 union members.
See "Report of the Grievance Department," 16 March 1949, UPWA Records.
Brody, The Butcher Workmen, 236, calculated that the UPWA ultimately re-
stored the jobs of 541 out of 591 discharged workers. See also Orear and
Diamond, Out of the Jungle.
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49. Ralph Helstein, interview, Chicago, 12 May 1983, ILHOP.
50. Horowitz, Negro and White, Unite and Fight, 220-27; Wilson J. Warren, "The
Limits of Social Democratic Unionism in Midwestem Meatpacking Communi-
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In Iowa, African Americans in Waterloo Local 46 took full
advantage of the supportive context created by the leadership's
antidiscrimination program. Compared to other Iowa packing-
houses. Rath Packing Company had a relatively high percent-
age of African Americans in its work force, and a number of
them had become prominent leaders of Local 46. The UPWA
"probably had the strongest policy on race that I've ever been
involved with before or since," recalled Jimmie Porter of Local
46.^ ^ Porter and other union activists built on the UPWA's tra-
dition of interracial unionism. They organized the Local 46 Anti-
Discrimination Department and built a vital program that suc-
cessfully attacked discriminatory behavior by Rath Company.
They also extended their activities into the community and be-
came the most prominent and important bastion for the civil
rights struggle in Waterloo.^ ^
In the wake of the 1948 strike, the Internafional's Anti-
Discrimination Department also established programs to address
women's concerns and cultivate women's union participation.
During the 1948 strike, Iowa women had stood shoulder to
shoulder with men. They had performed most of the critical
secretarial work and strike kitchen duty, and they were stal-
warts on the picket lines. They had been in the thick of con-
frontations with strikebreakers, police, and the National Guard.
Charles Mueller recalled that in Waterloo "women were right
in there banging away at the company just like the men were."^
51. Jimmie Porter, interview, Waterloo, 8 May 1986, UPWAOHP.
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Annals of Iowa 54 (1995), 208-13; Rick Halpern and Roger Horowitz, eds.,
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53. Charles Mueller, interview, UPWAOHP. See also "Trial Testimony of Dor-
othy Parker, Pete Jensen, Officer Hobart Mastain, and Margaret Boehmler,"
box 3, folder 7, Local 46 Papers; "James J. Healy Arbitrator for the 17 Dis-
chargeld] Arising Out of the Strike," 31 August 11948J, box 3, folder 2, Local
46 Papers; Dorothy Baker and Iota Hayes, Trial Testimony, box 3, folder 7,
Local 46 Papers; Lucille Bremer, interview, Waterloo, 2 June 1982, and Velma
Otterman, interview, ILHOP.
376 THE ANNALS OF IOWA
In the 1950s UPWA women repeatedly referred to the 1948 strike
to legitimate their demands for equal pay for equal work and
greater representation in imion offices. After observing women's
contributions to the strike, many union men found women's de-
mands for equality reasonable. In 1957 the UPWA attained equal
pay for equal work in union contracts.^
MOST UPWA MEMBERS viewed their union's strike recovery
in favorable terms, yet this massive labor confrontation had
long-term, damaging consequences. After the strike, companies
began to develop strategies to control labor militancy and frus-
trate strikes that might shut down production in the entire in-
dustry. For example, in the 1950s John Morrell officials began
t :> hire new workers who resided in rural areas outside Ottumwa.
Tifese workers from the countryside had never been acculturated
into the union loyalties of Ottumwa's working-class residents.
Nor had they "experienced the deeply transforming process of
building the unions to which they now paid dues." And, appar-
ently, veteran Local 1 leaders did not successfully cultivate the
full union allegiance of this "new generation" of Local 1 mem-
bers. Since the new workers had not experienced working con-
ditions at John Morrell during the pre-UPWA era, they balked
at Local l's repeated use of "wildcat" strikes to pressure John
Morrell. While veterans of the pre-union era regarded such ac-
tions as necessary to keep the company "in line" and reinforce
union solidarity, new workers perceived them as potentially
reducing their paychecks. The overall effect of divisions be-
tween veteran unionists and the new employees was a weaken-
ing of Local l's shop-floor power.^ ^
Management's determination to undermine union power
at the point of production coincided with other developments
54. Fehn, "Striking Women," 214-30. See also Dermis A. Deslippe, "'We Had
an Awful Time with Our Women': Iowa's Uruted Packinghouse Workers of
America, 1945-1975," Journal of Women's History 5 (1993), 10-32; and Fehn,
"'Chickens Come Home to Roost,'" 324-41.
55. Nelson Lichtenstein, Labor's War at Home: 'The CIO in World War U (Cam-
bridge, 1982), 123 (quotaHon); Warren, "When 'Ottumwa Went to the Dogs,'"
217-22, 225-30; idem, "Heyday of the CIO," 384-86.
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that eroded the very core of the UPWA's organized strength.
In the 1950s new independent meatpacking firms arose to chal-
lenge the dominance of the old-line companies such as Morrell,
Rath, Swift, and Armour. This "new breed" of meatpackers took
advantage of new technologies and established plants near feed-
lots in rural areas of Iowa and other Corn Belt states. The old-
line companies tried to respond to the new competition, but the
new meatpacking firms ultimately prevailed. In 1961 the union's
research department reported that, during the previous five years,
39,100 packinghouse workers had lost their jobs due to plant
closings and companies' technological adjustments. Such losses
were heavy blows to the UPWA, and in later decades the blows
only became worse. As Armour, Swift, Rath, and other compa-
nies closed or cut back on operatior\s, the UPWA's traditional
strongholds of union power in Chicago, Kansas City, and else-
where were virtually eliminated.^^
Yet the disaster to the union later wrought by fundamental
change in the industry in no sense tarnished what UPWA mem-
bers felt they had accomplished in the wake of the 1948 strike.
To some degree, the restoration of union power was a tribute
to the local union strength and solidarity the UPWA had estab-
lished during the 1930s and 40s. Local union members in Iowa
and elsewhere had grown accustomed to job actions and strikes
to win battles with companies. In these contests, union members
relied on one another and experienced the power of collective
action. Manifestations of union solidarity were visible through-
out the strike as Iowa unionists together stood on picket lines,
manned strike kitchens, confronted police, and meted out pim-
ishment to strikebreakers. In the strike's aftermath, union vet-
erans renewed membership solidarity by seeking to reestablish
the trademark of UPWA power—the steward system. They
56. "Facts and Figures," vol. 14, no. 21,27 July 1961, folder 14, box 513, UPWA
Records. For discussion of the economic transformation of the meatpacking
industry, see Horowitz, Negro and White, Unite and fight, 247-58; Kim Moody,
An Injury to All: The Decline of American Unionism (New York, 1988), 179-205;
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Women Workers, ed. Karen B. Sacks and Dorothy Remy (New Brunswick, NJ,
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further enhanced solidarity by breaking down barriers that had
divided workers on the basis of race or sex. For years, once
again, the UPWA was able to aggressively represent the inter-
ests of its members and remind companies that workers, when
organized, could build and maintain genuine power in their
relations with management—even amidst the adversity engen-
dered by a "lost" strike.

